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Abstract 
 
Human rights have been the focus of various governments’ foreign policy commitments, but they 
have not always made the transition from the rhetorical arena to the actual protection of human 
rights. One of the most important ways that nation states are held accountable for protecting 
human rights is through their cooperation with international human rights treaties, which then 
empower human rights activists. Nation states declare their binding commitment to the 
protections embodied in human rights treaties through the process of ratification. These treaties 
gain legitimacy when more nations ratify them, and it is particularly important that powerful 
nations take advantage of their influential position within the international community to ratify 
human rights treaties. In this study, I conducted a historical comparative analysis of the United 
Kingdom and the United States between 1960 and 1980. The United Kingdom ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, while the United States has not 
and this study seeks to identify what factors influence nation states’ decisions to ratify human 
rights treaties. This comparison offers a multidimensional analysis of nation state behavior 
through its unique combination of ideational-constructivist theory, world society approach, 
realism and republican liberalism. I analyzed government records to examine possible influential 
factors at domestic and international levels, focusing on documents that discuss the attitudes of 
political leaders toward the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A 
more comprehensive understanding of what factors influence nations to ratify human rights 
treaties will empower human rights advocates to more specifically target elements that affect 
nation states, if they hope to encourage the actualization of human rights commitments 
throughout the world.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 The fundamental goal of contemporary human rights activities is for individuals 
throughout the world to learn to recognize “the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family, [as it] is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world.”  This lofty mission is outlined in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which is considered the most important document for the evolution of global 
human rights in the post-World War II era. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one of 
the three documents that comprise the International Bill of Human Rights along with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The separate Covenants represent the artificial division of 
human rights into two separate branches, civil and political rights, and economic, social and 
cultural rights. Civil and political rights include “due process, freedom of speech, and the right to 
vote,” and tend to hold more precedence internationally (Donnelly 2007: 25). Economic, social 
and cultural rights include “entitlements to socially provided goods, services, and opportunities 
such as food, health care, social insurance, and education” (Donnelly 2007: 25). These rights are 
protected, respectively, by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which are the two main treaties 
for the protection of human rights through international human rights law.   
 Nation states become states parties by ratifying the Covenants, and as the number of 
states parties increase, the international legitimacy of the rights codified in the treaties grows as 
well. The United States’ status as a superpower within the international community gives it a 
unique role in the implementation of human rights treaties. When the United States ratifies a 
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treaty it not only effectively works to improve the lives of its own citizens, but the treaty also 
gains greater international legitimacy, and is thus endowed with more power to create change. 
This power is harnessed through civil society actors who are able to use these treaties as leverage 
to pressure governments into protecting the rights they promised to uphold (Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui 2006). The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights but has yet to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Due to the United States’ superpower status within the international community, its 
refusal to ratify the ICESCR hinders progress that could improve the attainment of economic, 
social and cultural rights not only within its own nation, but also throughout the world. Many of 
the rights embodied within the ICESCR have been addressed to some extent but not 
comprehensively throughout the United States. Those rights include labor rights, the right to 
health care, social security, education, to take part in cultural life, and to economic development, 
which is termed as the “right to an adequate standard of living.”  
 Understanding the factors that influence nation states’ decisions to ratify human rights 
treaties will provide us with insight into how we can effectively induce policy change to ensure 
that individuals’ rights are being protected. In this study, I will seek to identify what these factors 
are, by performing a comparative historical analysis between the United States and the United 
Kingdom. This historical analysis will cover the 1960s and 1970s, the period when the ICESCR 
became open for ratification, and when the United Kingdom ratified the Covenant while the 
United States did not. This difference motivates the comparison between the two nations. The 
difference is striking in light of their similar characteristics including a democratic structure, a 
commitment to human rights and a relatively powerful status within the international 
community. To uncover the reasons behind the discrepancy in action with regard to ratification, I 
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analyzed government documents from the United States, the United Kingdom, and United 
Nations documents. In exploring this comparison, I analyzed the documents for indications of 
why while both countries expressed a strong rhetorical commitment to human rights, the United 
Kingdom ratified the ICESCR but the United States refused to do so.   
 To properly analyze this commitment to economic, social and cultural rights, it was 
necessary to examine both nations’ attitudes toward the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, and the United Kingdom’s decision to ratify the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Since the 
United Kingdom ratified the ICESCR relatively early, the government documents I analyzed did 
not include international pressures being placed upon the United Kingdom. Since the 
international pressures targeted at the United States regarding the ICESCR were abundant, in 
order to accurately compare and contrast the actions of the two nations it was necessary to find a 
human rights treaty that supported economic, social and cultural rights that could illuminate how 
the United Kingdom responded to international pressures regarding ratification. The ECHR is 
such a treaty. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Timeline of United States and United Kingdom’s Activity Regarding the Covenant 
The ICESCR has been open for signature since December 19, 1966 and since then 160 nation 
states have ratified this covenant
1
. While it became open for signature in 1966, it didn’t enter into 
force until 1976, as entering into force is dependent on having a sufficient number of states 
backing the treaty through ratification. The differentiation between a signature and a ratification 
                                                 
1
 Appendix A contains a table of all nation states that have signed or ratified the ICESCR  
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lies with the binding nature of the commitment. When a nation state signs a treaty, it is obligated 
not to engage in activity that directly conflicts with the goals of the treaty. However, this 
signature does not leave the nation state legally bound to this obligation. It is only through 
ratification that the nation state is bound to upholding the goals and provisions set forth in the 
treaty. Nation states also have the option of acceding to the treaty, which has the same effect as 
ratification without having to sign the treaty first. The key dates surrounding the ICESCR are: 
 • December 16, 1966: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 opens for ratification 
 
 • September 16, 1968: The United Kingdom signs the ICESCR 
 • January 3, 1976: The ICESCR enters into force 
 • May 20, 1976: The United Kingdom ratifies the ICESCR 
 • October 5, 1977: The United States signs the ICESCR (but has not ratified) 
 
Theories Influencing International Behavior 
Republican Liberalism 
 A Republican Liberalist approach seeks to identify the likelihood that nation states will 
ratify human rights treaties based upon the type of government the nation has, and what their 
corresponding motivations are. This theory is outlined in Moravcsik’s “The Origins of Human 
Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” where he discusses how newly 
established democracies are more inclined to ratify human rights treaties to legitimize their 
government structure and decrease the likelihood that if a new power takes over the state will 
descend into an autocratic form of government. Moravcsik (2000: 228) states that these nations 
are ratifying treaties to “constrain the behavior of future national governments,” as ratification 
worked in the nations’ best interest to protect them from internal threats of government 
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overthrow and against external takeovers. Conversely, republican liberalism also predicts that 
nation states with well-established democracies are less likely to ratify binding international 
treaties. Moravcsik elaborates on this concept in stating that “established democracies can be 
expected to support rhetorical declarations in favor of human rights and regimes with optional 
enforcement that bind newly established democracies but exempt themselves” (2000: 229). 
Nation states’ notion of self-exemption can be perceived as connected to the concept of 
exceptionalism, as the nation is refusing to hold itself to the same standards as other members of 
the international community.  
Republican liberalism can shed light on why the United States did not ratify the ICESCR, but did 
choose to sign it. This theory predicts “long-established democracies will support only rhetorical 
or optional commitments” (Moravcsik 2000: 230). This notion can be applied to the case of the 
United States, as its leaders exhibited powerful rhetoric in advocating for human rights issues, 
but then did not bind themselves beyond rhetorical commitments to the provisions of the 
ICESCR. While this theory begins to explain the actions of the United States, it is insufficient in 
describing the rationale behind the United Kingdom’s actions. The United Kingdom is also a 
relatively powerful and longstanding democracy, but it has backed up its rhetorical commitments 
with a binding agreement via ratification.  
Realism  
The Realist approach emphasizes the role of self-interest and power in determining nation 
states’ actions. The states’ “interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise 
from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover 
the policies that will best serve a state’s interest [which is the preservation and strengthening of 
the state]” (Waltz 1979: 117). According to realist theory, nation states must determine whether 
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ratification of human rights treaties is in the interest of the preservation and strengthening of the 
state. Realist theory predicts that “norm-violating governments conform to human rights norms 
only when it is in their self-interest to comply with external pressures” and that compliance with 
these norms will increase when “pressures are applied by a hegemonic state and the target state is 
weak internationally” (Shor 2008: 119). This account of realist theory acknowledges the role that 
self-interest plays in guiding actions, and the calculation of this self-interest is influenced by the 
relative power of the nation state. Realist theory could begin to explain why the United States 
hasn’t ratified the Covenant, as it is a leading world power and therefore isn’t considered 
vulnerable to these human rights norms, however it fails to take into account the influence that 
international pressures have on the United States. Furthermore, realist theory fails to capture why 
the United Kingdom, which is also relatively powerful in the international community, would 
ratify the ICESCR, since they were not targeted by more powerful nation states to ratify the 
treaty.  
Ideational-Constructivist Theory 
 Ideational-Constructivist Theory emphasizes the role of norms, social actors, and identity 
with regard to decision-making processes of nation states (Cardenas 2004: 213). As nation states 
create social change through “…a process of self-reflection and political actions that are shaped 
by collectively held norms,” the cultural-institutional context must be taken into account because 
self-reflection does not occur in isolation but rather through the communication of norms 
(Katzenstein 1996: 21). The manner in which these norms are communicated within the cultural-
institutional context presents nation states with “political constraints and opportunities that can 
substantially affect how governments calculate their interest” (Katzenstein 1996:19). This 
reference to a rational calculation based on norms enhances the realist conception of a rational 
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calculation to incorporate forces other than self-interest and power. These norms are more likely 
to lead to human rights reform when international pressures coincide with domestic pressures, 
which generally arise from civil society (Cardenas 2004: 216). Cardenas explains how civil 
society in a given nation “mediates the impact of international pressure,” leading me to take into 
account public opinion polls from the time frame under investigation for the United States (2004: 
215). Understanding what American civil society valued during this era will illuminate the 
relationship between government actors’ decision-making and that of their citizens’ desires. As 
shown below, the American people felt favorably toward the handling of human rights affairs 
when the signing of the ICESCR took place, so opposition to the treaty cannot be considered an 
explanatory factor for the United States’ lack of ratification.  
Ideational-constructivists stress the level of norm influence on the nation state in 
predicting the nations’ behavior, as they understand stronger international norms as being more 
likely to constrain the nations’ behavior (Cardenas 2004: 214). This suggests that the way nation 
states interact with each other is heavily dependent not only on what will benefit their country 
the most, but on international pressures they might be facing, in addition to how they view 
themselves relative to other nation states. This focus on nation states’ sense of identity is 
intimately tied with the cultural-institutional context of human rights norms as “Cultural-
institutional contexts do not merely constrain actors by changing the incentives that shape their 
behavior…[or] regulate behavior. They also help to constitute the very actors whose conduct 
they seek to regulate.” (Katzenstein 1996: 22). As nation states begin to socialize these norms, 
they become part of the nations’ sense of identity. Socialization refers to the “process by which 
international norms are internalized and implemented domestically” (Risse, Ropp, Sikkink 1999: 
5). As norm influence becomes more pervasive with the greater number of nations identifying 
  8  
   
with and endorsing it, the “diffusion of international norms in the human rights area crucially 
depends on the establishment and sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational 
actors” (Risse et al. 1999:5). This illuminates a potential reason why the United Kingdom ratified 
the ICESCR, as its membership within the European Union, which is considered an 
intergorvernmental organization, strengthened the influence of human rights norms on the United 
Kingdom’s sense of identity. However, this cannot be applied to the case of the United States, 
because despite its position on the Security Council within the United Nations, which is also 
considered an intergovernmental organization, the human rights norms did not penetrate its 
national identity enough to compel it to ratify the ICESCR.  
World Society Approach 
 The world society approach depicts the nation state as “constructions of a common wider 
culture, rather than as self-directed actors responding rationally to internal and external 
contingencies” (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, Ramirez 1997: 152). The commitment to protecting 
human rights is one example of this worldwide cultural construction that nation states “routinely 
organize and legitimate themselves in terms of” (Meyer et al. 1997: 148). The world society 
approach provides an explanation for the gap between rhetorical human rights commitment and 
actual policy change. It states that this “decoupling is endemic because nation-states are modeled 
on an external culture that cannot simply be imported wholesale as a fully functioning system” 
(Meyer et al. 1997: 154). This could partially explain why the United States maintains a 
rhetorical commitment to human rights without ratifying the ICESCR, as it would rather create 
domestic initiatives that work toward the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights 
embodied within the Covenant, rather than committing itself to full realization of these rights. 
However, the world society approach predicts that this decoupling occurs when “formal 
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structuration
2
 and centralization are difficult, [so] state managers may retreat simply to planning 
for future progress”; this overwhelmingly occurs in peripheral countries where the resources to 
implement the actualization of these cultural models are lacking (Meyer et al. 1997: 155). As the 
United States is well equipped to ratify international human rights treaties, implementing formal 
structuration through the ratification of the ICESCR is not beyond its capabilities. 
The world society approach expands upon this notion of nation states as embedded within 
the international community to predict that those which are more integrated are more likely to 
ratify human rights treaties, especially when their neighboring countries have done so (Tsutsui 
and Wotipka 2008). Great Britain’s level of involvement within the United Nations indicates that 
the United Kingdom is quite integrated within the international community. This theory may 
shed some light on why the United Kingdom ratified the treaty so much earlier than the United 
States, as its neighboring countries of Denmark, Sweden and Norway signed and ratified the 
treaty before the United Kingdom did. Additionally, Belgium, Poland and Italy signed the 
covenant before the United Kingdom, and ratified it around the same time as United Kingdom. 
The world society approach does little however, to account for the actions of the United States. 
While the United States is quite integrated within the international community, its lack of 
ratification cannot be explained by this theory alone.  
 
The Argument: Combining the Four Theories 
 For the purposes of this paper, I blend these four theories to provide a better 
understanding of the factors influencing the United States and United Kingdoms’ actions toward 
the ICESCR. The international pressures and norms surrounding human rights that are affecting 
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 Structuration refers to the “formation and spread of explicit, rationalized, differentiated organizational forms” 
(Meyer et al. 1997: 156) 
  10  
   
these governments must be analyzed, but this analysis cannot afford to overlook the component 
of self-interest and power that guides how the nation states will interpret and value the 
international pressures. The realist and constructivist components of theory reinforce one another 
and shed light on how each nation’s unique social location influences its decision-making.   
 Taken individually, none of these theories can accurately explain the actions of the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  Republican liberalism hypothesizes that neither the 
United States nor the United Kingdom would ratify the ICESCR, as they are both stable 
democracies. Realist theory similarly predicts that neither nation would ratify the Covenant, due 
to their relative power within the international community, which leaves them less vulnerable to 
international pressures than weaker nation states would be. While realist theory emphasizes the 
role of self-interest, it does not sufficiently explore what factors affect nation states’ calculation 
of self-interest. This shortcoming can be compensated for by the incorporation of ideational-
constructivist theory and world society approach in explaining the nation states’ behavior. 
Ideational-constructivist theory predicts that both the United States and the United Kingdom 
would ratify the ICESCR, as it states that when international pressures coincide with domestic 
pressures, the nation state will act accordingly to these demands. The civil society of both the 
United States and the United Kingdom supported human rights, and the international community 
was also pressuring nations to ratify the Covenant. World society approach hypothesizes that 
both the United States and the United Kingdom would ratify the ICESCR, as it predicts that 
nations which are deeply embedded within the international community are more likely to ratify 
international human rights treaties.  
While ideational-constructivist theory focuses on norms, social actors and their 
international relations, the world society approach complements this well by focusing on the 
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nation states’ embeddedness within the international community. By combining these two 
approaches one can better understand how the sense of identity and international relationships 
mutually reinforce one another and influence decision-making. Republican liberalism provides a 
lens for understanding why the United States did not ratify the ICESCR, but fails to explain the 
behavior of the United Kingdom toward the same Covenant. Realist theory discusses the notions 
of power and self-interest more broadly, which will be important to both the United Kingdom 
and United States, as ultimately all nation states want to act in their self-interest. Combining 
these theories allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how self-interest is determined 
and how it interacts with power to influence nation states in their decision-making processes.  
 
Human Rights History of the United States and the United Kingdom 
 As this study seeks to identify the motivations behind nation states’ decisions to ratify or 
not ratify the ICESCR, it is important to note any discrepancies in motivation that exist between 
the domestic and international levels. For the purposes of the background section, I have split the 
influential factors into those at domestic and international levels. As compliance with human 
rights treaties and norms is “tied to interstate bargaining” in addition to “domestic politics in the 
countries applying pressure…as well as in the target state” it is important to analyze any 
discrepancies that exist both across the two nations on both international and domestic levels, 
and within each nation at the international and domestic levels (Cardenas 2004: 219). This 
implies that forums like the United Nations and other international networks where diplomats 
and international actors communicate with one another to make decisions influence nation state 
behavior. The domestic level also influences nation state behavior as the government 
representatives for the United States and United Kingdom are influenced by domestic politics 
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within both their own countries and by those countries pressuring them. As the Cold War was 
one of the most salient international factors affecting the handling of foreign affairs during this 
era, I discuss its predicted impact on human rights treaty ratification below. I then discuss 
domestic factors related to the nations’ handling of economic, social and cultural rights including 
the concept of exceptionalism, human rights initiatives within both nations, public opinion within 
the United States, and the distinct structural frameworks for treaty ratification within each nation, 
followed by a discussion of the nations’ understanding of the ICESCR as a non-self executing 
treaty.  
International Factor: The Cold War 
  The Cold War exerted significant influence on international politics in the post-World 
War era, and human rights issues were affected by it. As the USSR and the United States battled 
for superpower status and the arms race reached a frightening level, all issues of foreign policy 
were affected, and human rights was no exception. The Cold War could be interpreted as a 
potential factor that influenced the split of the covenants, or the creation of separate covenants 
for civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. Socialist countries and the 
USSR in particular were aligned with economic, social and cultural rights, and the belief exists 
that the United States’ support for civil and political rights but not for economic, social and 
cultural rights could be interpreted as declaring U.S. leaders’ opposition to socialism. Whelan 
and Donnelly argue that research which states that Cold War ideology is an explanation for the 
split between economic social and cultural rights from political and civil rights has not been 
firmly grounded. However, they still admit that United States policy was “deeply intertwined 
with Cold War ideological rivalry.” (2007: 930). The United Kingdom was aligned with the 
United States during the Cold War, however, therefore providing an interesting case for 
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comparison in discovering what factors motivated it to transcend this Cold War ideology and 
ratify the ICESCR.  
 Another interpretation of Cold War ideology is discussed by Wotipka and Tsutsui (2008). 
While the Cold War may have drawn attention from the United Nations’ focus on human rights, 
it also may have functioned as a “…facilitating factor in governments’ decisions to ratify human 
rights treaties because many governments could expect one of the superpowers to protect them 
when their human rights violations became a target of criticism” (Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008: 
732). While neither the United States nor the United Kingdom were in the position to need 
protection from superpowers, it would be negligent to not mention how the Cold War shaped 
attitudes to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights more broadly. 
This similarity implies that the influence of the Cold War does not sufficiently explain the 
discrepancies between treaty ratification with the United States and United Kingdom.  
Domestic Factor: Attitudes of Exceptionalism 
 Attitudes of exceptionalism have traditionally been associated with the United States, 
especially Americans’ sense of individualistic national identity. Fischer (2008) examines the 
level of individualism that characterizes the United States and compares it to other European 
countries, uncovering contradictions within the overarching perception of “American 
exceptionalism.” Fischer defines American exceptionalism or “American individualism” as a 
rejection of the state and a sense of impatience regarding restraints upon economic activity. The 
definition of American exceptionalism inherently aligns it against economic, social, and cultural 
rights, since it can be understood as a lack of patience for interference with economic activity, 
which would ultimately arise in some form from the promotion of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Fischer’s examination of cross-national poll data revealed that “…Americans were likelier 
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than other Western nation states to understand the world in terms of independent, self-reliant 
individuals,” as exemplified by the statistic that Americans are two times more likely than 
Europeans to believe that laziness explains poverty (2008: 365). However despite this statistic 
the research also showed that in contrast to other Western countries, Americans favored group 
interests over individual interests (Fischer 2008). Fischer cites Robin Williams’ argument that 
individualistic attitudes are more prevalent in certain spheres, like the economic sphere, while 
attitudes that support group norms above individualistic norms are more prevalent in spheres like 
the family or church (Fischer 2008).  
 Williams’ argument suggests a possible clue: ratification of the ICESCR would fall into 
the economic sphere, where American’s individualistic attitudes prevail, and exceptionalist 
attitudes could thus hinder promotion of ratification. The United States’ failure to ratify the 
ICESCR could illustrate that the United States government or American general public do not 
align their sense of national identity with that of the goals laid forth in the ICESCR, as the 
American sense of national identity is heavily intertwined with notions of individualism. 
However the public opinion polls that surveyed the population on their opinion of Carter’s 
handling of human rights, after his signing of the Covenant, would suggest that an overwhelming 
opposition to the ICESCR was not the reasoning behind the United States’ lack of ratification 
(discussed further below).  
 Within the United States, the refusal to ratify could be envisioned as exceptionalistic, 
given its history of refusing to become a party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) because 
it refused to grant the United States specific requested exemptions. The creation of the ICC was 
conceived as a transnational institution that would be empowered with the ability to prosecute 
individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression 
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(Wippman 2004: 153). The United States eventually refused to support the International 
Criminal Court, when the framers of the ICC emphasized that the United States would be held to 
the same standards as other countries in terms of restricted state sovereignty, despite its 
superpower status. David Wippman explains that the United States refused to support the ICC 
because “For the United States, creation of the ICC in its present form represents a deliberate (if 
minor) shift in the architecture of international society. It transfers coercive authority, even if 
only slightly, from powerful states and the UN Security Council to an international tribunal” 
(2004: 179). Refusing to be held to the same international standards as other countries, as with 
this case, exhibits attitudes of exceptionalism that may influence the decisions of the American 
government on ratification of international treaties.  
Timeline of Human Rights Initiatives in the United States and United Kingdom 
 Despite the prioritization of civil and political rights in American society, Presidents 
throughout the years have expressed interest in advocating for economic, social and cultural 
rights. Some of these domestic-led initiatives include Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Four 
Freedoms” speech, Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” and Jimmy Carter’s signing of the 
ICESCR and his encouragement of the United States Senate to push the treaty through the 
ratification process. The United Kingdom also passed legislation to promote human rights on the 
domestic front including the Race Relations Act and National Health Service Act. The United 
Kingdom and the United States also had a combined effort in 1941 to promote human rights 
through the drafting of the Atlantic Charter. Since both the United States and the United 
Kingdom regarded economic, social and cultural rights provisions favorably on the domestic 
front, this similarity among the cases implies that domestic government attitudes toward these 
rights cannot fully explain the lack of ratification on behalf of the United States.  
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1941: Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms Speech and the Drafting of the Atlantic Charter: 
 Roosevelt vocalized to the American people what he envisioned as basic rights for 
citizens in the United States in January of 1941. In his famous “Four Freedoms Speech” he 
outlined that American people should experience freedom of speech and expression, freedom of 
everyone to worship god, freedom of want, and freedom from fear. His third freedom, the 
freedom from want, addresses the very real need of all American citizens to have access to 
economic rights. While the United States was in a state of affluence, there still remained groups 
in society that were excluded from this affluence including the working class, and those 
marginalized due to their race. While the nation as a whole was ascending as an economic 
superpower during the 1940s, “…if there had been a ‘poverty rate’ at that time, it would have 
identified at least 40 million people, 30 percent of the population, as ‘poor’” (Patterson 1996:62). 
 In August of 1941 Franklin Roosevelt of the U.S. and Winston Churchill of the U.K. 
combined efforts to bring this notion of the “freedom of want” to the attention of the 
international scene through their drafting of the Atlantic Charter. This statement was seen as a 
collaboration of the United States and the United Kingdom’s efforts to bring economic and social 
rights to the forefront (Whelan and Donnelly 2007). Among the goals of the Charter was to 
“bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of 
securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.”
3
 
 1964: Johnson’s War on Poverty: President Lyndon B. Johnson, taking on the role of the 
presidency after the passing of John F. Kennedy, was determined to begin a relentless “War on 
                                                 
3
 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp 
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Poverty.” Though the United States was in the midst of an unprecedented state of affluence, 
Johnson was perhaps overly optimistic about his prediction that this “unconditional war” could 
eliminate poverty within ten years (Patterson 1996: 542). To commence this war on poverty 
Johnson passed the Economic Opportunity Act, which included the implementation of 
community action programs that aimed at giving the poor an active role in gaining education and 
employment (Patterson 1996:536).  
 1965 and 1976 Race Relations Acts: The Race Relations Act of 1965 was the first piece 
of legislation within the United Kingdom that addressed racial discrimination. One year later, 
this act also led to the creation of the Race Relations Board to handle complaints that occurred 
under the Act. This 1965 Act was weak however, only prohibiting discrimination occurring in 
specific “places of public resort,” which did little to stop racial discrimination.
4
 The original 
1965 Act was repealed in 1976 and replaced by a stronger Race Relations Act that expanded race 
discrimination to include indirect discrimination, and created the Commission for Racial 
Equality for individuals to seek enforcement of the Act.  
 1977: National Health Service Act: The National Health Service (NHS) is an umbrella 
term referring to the four government funded healthcare systems in the United Kingdom. All 
residents of the United Kingdom are permitted health care through this service without 
discrimination. The National Health Service Act of 1977 states that it is the duty of the Secretary 
of State to promote a health service designed to improve physical and mental health of citizens 
and to prevent and treat illness. This legislation ensures that citizens are granted the social right 
to healthcare, which is one of the provisions within the ICESCR.  
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 1977: Carter’s Promotion of Human Rights: Months before President Carter’s signing of 
the ICESCR, he delivered his first foreign policy statement before the United Nations General 
Assembly in March of 1977. He called for the strengthening of the Commission on Human 
Rights, and also expressed his intent to ratify both the ICESCR and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Walsh, 1977, p. A12). Carter also promised to seek “a more open 
foreign policy [and to continue] speak[ing] frankly about the policies we intend to pursue” as a 
nation (Walsh, 1977, p. A12). In October of the same year, President Carter made true on his 
promises as he signed both covenants and pressured the Senate to push the treaties through the 
ratification process.  
 While both nation states expressed a rhetorical commitment to human rights, the United 
Kingdom’s willingness to comply to international provisions was unmet by the United States’ 
stalling of ratification. While the nation states are similar in their rhetorical commitment, the 
cases diverge in the ratification phase.  
Domestic Factor: Public Opinion within the United States 
 In democratic countries, the population at large has an influence on the actions of 
government actors, it is important to understand if there was significant opposition to the 
ICESCR among citizens that could be an explanatory factor for the lack of ratification. National 
polls from 1977 that surveyed the public’s opinion about Carter’s handling of human rights 
issues reveal that staunch public opposition was not the case in the United States.  
 One poll conducted in May of 1977 by American Public Opinion on Human Rights asked 
citizens, “How much have you heard or read about human rights as a foreign affairs issue?” and 
asked them to choose their response from: a great deal, fair amount, very little, or nothing at all 
(Roper Center). 27% of respondents reported that they had heard or read a great deal, 40% said a 
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fair amount, 25% knew very little, 7% reported nothing at all, and 1% responded that they had no 
opinion. This would indicate that around two thirds of the population thought they were well 
informed about human rights and how they factored into international relations.  
 A second poll asked respondents to think about President Carter’s first year in office and 
to grade his performance in dealing with human rights. This poll was conducted in October of 
1977, and the selections for responses included excellent, good, only fair, poor but passing, and 
failure (Roper Center, Cambridge Reports/National Omnibus Survey). Since Carter signed the 
ICESCR on October 5
th
 of 1977, his signing of the covenant was probably one of the most recent 
developments with regard to human rights and international affairs, and it can be assumed that 
this action might have still been salient in their minds when considering their response. 12% 
responded that they felt Carter had done an excellent job, 42% responded that he had done a 
good job, 29% responded “only fair,” 12% judged him as having done poorly but passing, and 
5% felt he had failed in dealing with human rights. Again, the majority of respondents felt that 
Carter had done a positive job in dealing with human rights, right after he had signed the 
ICESCR, and so the lack of public support for the covenant does not appear to be the factor that 
prevented the United States from ratifying the treaty.  
Domestic Factor: Distinct Structural Frameworks for Treaty Ratification 
 It is important to take into account any discrepancies that exist between the procedures 
for treaty ratification within the United States and the United Kingdom. In the United States, the 
Senate is the government body that must consent to treaty ratification. Before the treaty arrives at 
the Senate, it must be reviewed by the U.S. State Department, which provides the President with 
a recommendation regarding the treaty. The State Department then prepares the documents to 
submit to the Senate for consideration of the treaty’s ratification, which is sometimes 
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accompanied by a letter from the President supporting the ratification, as was the case with the 
ICESCR. Once the treaty has arrived in the Senate it is forwarded to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, which holds hearings to determine if the treaty should be ratified. At this 
time, reservations or declarations may be added to the treaty in order to better conform its goals 
to that of the United States’ government policy, and the treaty can be ratified with these 
modifications attached. In order to become ratified, the treaties must pass through the Senate 
with a two-thirds vote.  
 The ratification procedure in the United Kingdom takes the form of a parliamentary vote. 
The parliament is divided into the upper house, the House of Lords, and the lower house, the 
House of Commons. The Ponsonby Rule declares that usually international treaties are placed 
before parliament for a period of 21 days before they come up for a vote. Once treaties are 
ratified within the United Kingdom their provisions do not immediately become part of the legal 
system, but must be incorporated into their domestic law through Acts of Parliament. Acts of 
Parliament must receive approval from the Sovereign, the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons.  
 It is also worth noting that the United Kingdom’s government differs from the United 
States’ government in the sense that it does not have a codified constitution. The United 
Kingdom has an assortment of statutory provisions and common law rules that ascribe rights and 
liberties to the citizens. This common law is arrived at through judicial decisions rather than 
through legislative or executive procedures. During the era under study the United Kingdom did 
not have a constitutional court, which under the common law system made the United 
Kingdom’s government structure less adaptable to implementation of new law (Moravscik 
2000). This suggests that the United Kingdom would be less likely to ratify treaties that 
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necessitated the incorporation of new laws. However, its ratification of the ICESCR provides 
evidence that although structural difficulties associated with the ratification process may have 
existed, they were not significant enough to hinder ratification. Likewise, any difficulties 
associated with the treaty ratification process within the United States do not explain a lack of 
ratification, as multiple other international human rights treaties have successfully passed 
through its ratification process. While noting differences in government structure between the 
nations allows us to more comprehensively analyze the comparison, these differences do not 
serve as an explanatory factor for the discrepancy of ratification among the nations.  
Domestic Factor: Interpretation of the ICESCR as Non Self-Executing 
 There is some level of debate surrounding the self-executing and non-self executing 
nature of human rights treaties. A treaty is considered self-executing if domestic law does not 
need to be enacted in order to formally protect the rights embodied in the treaty. Discussion 
within both the United States and the United Kingdom indicated that the governments 
themselves needed to determine if they considered the ICESCR to be self-executing.  The United 
Kingdom cited the ICESCR as an example of a treaty that was not “readily susceptible to legal 
enforcement by the international courts of Contracting States…[and that its implementation 
depended] upon the adoption of appropriate economic and social policies by the governments of 
those States.”
5
 The United States also interpreted the ICESCR to be a non-self executing treaty, 
as a majority of legal scholars stated that “the only rights in that covenant which might be 
deemed self-executing are one or two which are ‘negative’
6
 in character” like the right to join 
trade unions for example, which wouldn’t require any active intervention from the government 
                                                 
5
 Plant, Cyril, ‘Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights: The protection of human rights  by law in 
 Northern Ireland’ (Cmnd 7009, 1977) [40] 
6
 Negative rights require that governments refrains from acting in a manner that hinders the attainment of the right. 
This is contrasted with positive rights, which oblige governments to take action to ensure these rights are being 
protected.    
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(International Human Rights Treaties, 1979). Both nations’ understanding of the ICESCR as 
non-self executing illustrates that the implementation procedures necessary to protect the rights 
within the ICESCR are more extensive than with self-executing treaties. However, this similarity 
in interpretation among the cases indicates that the non-self executing nature of the ICESCR is 
not a sufficient cause for lack of ratification by the United States.  
 
Hypothesis 
 I hypothesize that the United States’ refusal to ratify the ICESCR is due to the 
international influences of the Cold War combined with domestic attitudes of exceptionalism 
within the nation. Ideational-constructivist theory stresses the notion of identity in predicting 
nation states’ behavior, and in combining this with realism’s focus on power, I predict that the 
superpower status of the United States encourages an exceptionalistic national identity. As the 
Cold War was a particularly salient factor in motivating the artificial division among the 
Covenants, this division aligned the United States more with civil and political rights and the 
USSR with economic, social and cultural rights. I believe that since the United Kingdom wasn’t 
directly involved with the superpower competition between these two nations, it was able to 
ratify the ICESCR without negative pressures from its domestic government. I hypothesize that 
international pressures felt by the Cold War encouraged the United States to set its policy apart 
from the USSR. I hypothesize that these pressures were complemented by attitudes of 
exceptionalism within the United States due to its superpower status and high level of power 
within the international community, and hence, relative autonomy. While the United Kingdom 
was still a powerful nation, it did not have the same superpower status and was not as heavily 
influenced by the Cold War. I hypothesize that the United Kingdom was therefore more 
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susceptible to international pressures that encouraged human rights treaty ratification, holding it 
consequently more accountable to the international community.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 This thesis examines how nation states’ characteristics influence their decisions to ratify 
human rights treaties, by comparing the types of arguments debated within the United States and 
the United Kingdom regarding ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and analyzing how these arguments influenced nation state’s 
decisions to ratify or not ratify the Covenant. 
 
Why A Comparison of the United States and United Kingdom? 
 I chose to conduct a comparative historical analysis between the United States and the 
United Kingdom because they have many similarities, aside from the focal difference in treaty 
ratification with regard to the ICESCR. The United States and the United Kingdom are an 
appropriate set of nation states to compare because both advocate for human rights, while the 
United States has not yet ratified the ICESCR, and the United Kingdom has. Both the United 
Kingdom
7
 and the United States are powerful members of the international community, as they 
both hold permanent seats
8
 within the United Nations’ Security Council. While studies have been 
performed that focus on a larger number of countries to analyze treaty ratification patterns, the 
unique focus of this study is its analysis of the United States’ actions as the leading global 
                                                 
7
 The differentiation between the presence of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom and not in Great Britain is not 
significant enough to the purposes of this paper to warrant a distinction, and therefore these terms will be used 
synonymously throughout this paper. 
8
 Permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council hold a great deal of power within the United Nations, as if even 
one P-5 vetoes a resolution it cannot pass, and four out of the five members must approve a resolution for it to pass 
(Donnelly, 2007, p. 25).   
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hegemon, which has yet to be examined specifically in regard to economic social and cultural 
rights. Contrasting this case with another powerful nation state allows us to look beyond their 
rhetorical commitments to human rights to begin to understand what underlying causes are 
affecting the nations’ actions.  
 I chose to perform a comparative historical analysis because investigating the time frame 
that government leaders were making the decision to ratify or not is crucial to my study. The 
historical component of my thesis allows me to focus on these crucial years ranging from 1960 to 
1980, in examining what influenced the United Kingdom to ratify the Covenant and what factors 
may account for the United States’ failure to ratify. This time frame is important because this is 
the period in which the United States took signatory action in support of the ICESCR, and when 
the United Kingdom took the initiative to both sign and ratify the document, consequently 
making this the era in which the document was most heavily debated in both nations. As of 2007, 
the ICESCR remains pending before the United States Senate, and has been classified by the 
assistant secretary of state as a treaty that is “currently on the committee calendar on which the 
administration does not support senate action,” which further lends support to studying the time 
frame where the ICESCR was still being actively considered for ratification (“Treaty Priority 
List Sets out Administration Priorities for Senate Action” 2007: 873). Comparing parallel 
sources and forums for the United States and the United Kingdom will allow me to begin to 
understand what types of factors regarding ratification impacted each government, and what 
types of arguments were the most influential within and across the nation states. I performed a 
content analysis of the government documents I studied, as it allows me to best understand the 
arguments put forth by the United States and United Kingdom, and by considering these 
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statements in the context of domestic and international factors, to assess how the salience of 
these arguments differs across the two nation states.     
 
Sources Investigated 
 To study factors that may have influenced the United States and United Kingdom in their 
decision-making about the ICESCR, it was necessary to examine different sources of archival 
data. Since government actors were those responsible for making the decision to ratify human 
rights treaties, I felt it was important to study the dialogue that was occurring within both the 
United States and the United Kingdom governments at the national level. I also felt it was 
essential to supplement these analyses by examining the dialogue occurring between actors on 
the international level, and I especially wanted to see if there were any discrepancies between 
what government actors were saying on the national level, and what they relayed to the 
international community. I supplemented the national level data with my analysis of United 
Nations documents, specifically records of General Assembly sessions.  
United States Government Documents 
I used the Lexis Nexis Congressional database to search for United States government 
documents to analyze. The text I relied on most heavily to examine attitudes underlying the 
United States’ decision not to ratify the ICESCR was the Senate hearing record, entitled 
“International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations” 
which was held by the 96
th
 Congress during the First Session on November 14th through 19
th
 in 
1979. I chose this document because it is a record of debate that specifically pertains to ratifying 
the Covenant, which occurred after President Carter signed the Covenant and submitted it to the 
Senate for consideration. These hearings are important because they contain discussions that 
  26  
   
illuminate the nation’s concerns about taking further action toward ratifying the ICESCR. This 
record also includes President Carter’s letter to the Senate requesting recommendations 
regarding the ICESCR, which I considered important because he was heartily endorsing the 
Covenant and was constrained by the Senate. This record also included statements that had been 
inserted by not only government actors but also members of interest groups that promoted human 
rights, law professors specializing in the area of human rights, and attorneys who felt that the 
treaty was important. I chose to analyze these statements that had been inserted for the record to 
get an idea of what civil society was saying to influence the government actors. I believe that 
these outside statements are important because I know with certainty that they were specifically 
brought to the attention of government actors. By contrast, if I had used statements from other 
activists from the era I wouldn’t definitively know if their claims had been brought to the 
attention of government actors. Therefore, I wouldn’t know if their claims could be validly 
considered as a factor affecting the government’s decision not to ratify the Covenant.  
 Using Lexis Nexis Congressional, I also analyzed a document from the Congressional 
Research Service prepared by an analyst in International Relations within the Foreign Affairs 
and National Defense Division, entitled “Primer of U.N. Human Rights Treaties” from 1977. I 
felt it important to see what other sectors of government that dealt with the Covenant, aside from 
the Senate, were concluding about ratifying the Covenant. This document was important because 
it succinctly discussed portions of the Covenant that U.S. Representatives found problematic, 
thus expanding my perspective beyond the Senate, and also highlighting “problem areas” to be 
aware of in further discussions.    
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United Kingdom Government Documents 
 I determined that the equivalent to studying United States government documents within 
the United Kingdom was to focus on their Parliamentary Papers. For my research purposes, the 
Parliamentary Papers include records of votes and proceedings, debates, and Sessional Papers. 
Sessional Papers refer to public bills, reports of committees of Parliament, Reports of Royal 
Commissions (which do research for the Parliament) and other international agreements. Reports 
of Royal Commissions and other international agreements are referred to as Command Papers. I 
used the Parliamentary Papers to analyze government decision-making processes within the 
United Kingdom, as I found them to be of a comparable forum to the United States domestic 
government documents I had studied. I was able to find these documents through the House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers research database, which operates through Proquest.  
 I studied Command Papers within the United Kingdom that were composed of reports 
from various commissions. One of these included the Report from the Select Committee on 
Overseas Development: “Human Rights and the Development Strategy” from 1973, which 
discussed the importance of implementing treaty provisions regarding economic, social and 
cultural rights. This report was significant because it discussed the government’s attitudes toward 
the manner in which economic, social and cultural rights could be implemented. It is important 
to understand how the nation feels about the rights themselves, and how they envision them 
impacting their country. Another Command Paper I analyzed included the report from the 
Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights detailing the protection of human rights in 
Northern Ireland from 1977. This report specifically discussed the implementation measures the 
United States thought would be necessary for the actualization of the rights included a discussion 
of the non self-executing nature of the ICESCR.  
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 I also analyzed the Command Papers that included the Report on the Proceedings of the 
21
st
 Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations from 1966. Although these 
summarized an international level document, it was constructed to express the sentiments of the 
United Kingdom at the time, and so I am including it within the United Kingdom documents. 
The portion I derived useful data from specifically discussed the United Kingdom’s sentiments 
regarding the Covenant and the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights before the 
United Kingdom became party to the ICESCR. This was part of an effort to locate documents 
including the United Kingdom’s discussion of the ICESCR prior to its signing of the document 
in order to determine if their interest in economic, social and cultural rights shifted since the 
drafting of the treaty or if it remained relatively the same.  I analyzed what concerns were 
brought up before the signing of the treaty to see if there were provisions that the governments 
felt should be adopted by the international community at large, or that they were particularly 
against.  
International Level Government Documents 
 I used the Access UN research database to find United Nations documents that focused 
on discussion of the ICESCR. Access UN functioned as a search engine so that I could find 
records pertaining to the ICESCR that I wanted to use, and then locate these documents in the 
Government Documents segment of the University of Michigan Library.  
 I have examined the 1977 General Assembly records of the Third Committee, 32
nd
 
Session, discussing Agenda Item 81, which focuses on the international community’s attitudes 
toward the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights. The General Assembly is 
composed of all representatives from the member states to the United Nations, and each nation 
state has the ability to contribute to the discussion. I selected the records from 1977 because they 
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occurred right after the United States signed the ICESCR. I found these records to be important 
because they included the motivations stated by the United States for its change in rhetoric 
regarding its support for economic, social and cultural rights. The interactions of the United 
Kingdom and the United States with the broader international community provided insight into 
how international pressures impacted these nations’ decisions regarding ratification.   
 
Coding Method 
 In performing a content analysis, I have organized my coding system by the arguments 
and justifications discussed by the nation state regarding their stance on ratification of the 
ICESCR. My key codes include exceptionalism, international pressures, implementation 
concerns and legal conflicts. 
Codes: Exceptionalism 
 The exceptionalism code was deductive, as I came across it as a potential influence on 
nation state behavior while conducting literature reviews. The concept of exceptionalism can be 
framed within the notion of individualistic national identity, which is generally understood as 
being more characteristic of the United States due to its role as a superpower. When I read a 
statement that referred to a nation state exempting themselves from standards that others in the 
international community are held to, I coded it as exceptionalistic. I also coded statements 
exceptionalistic that signified that the nation felt that they could handle a matter better on a 
domestic level than by upholding the same standards that the international provisions required.  
Codes: International Pressures 
 This code was deductive, as I assumed that international relations would play an integral 
role in the decision-making process of nation states. This also speaks to the superpower role of 
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the United States and how it might react differently to international pressures than other nation 
state governments that are more vulnerable. I coded a statement as an “international pressure” 
whenever I read of a nation state that expressed concerns about credibility or how other countries 
were perceiving its decisions or actions. Conversely, I also coded statements as “international 
pressures” if they contained statements from other countries addressing the United States or 
United Kingdoms’ actions regarding ICESCR ratification.  
Codes: Implementation Concerns 
 This code was inductive, as in the government documents the United States and United 
Kingdom actors discussed how they could logistically implement the treaty provisions while 
respecting their domestic traditions. I coded a statement as an “implementation concern” if the 
United States or the United Kingdom expressed concern about how they would logistically 
ensure that the treaty provisions were being promoted on the domestic level. The implementation 
concern code differs from the legal conflicts with domestic government code (below) in the 
sense that the latter is only applicable to legal conflicts with existing domestic law, rather than 
the “implementation concern” code which addresses issues regarding how the nation state should 
take the concepts resonating within the treaty documents and create infrastructural change to 
ensure that these rights are being protected for the people of the nation.     
Codes: Legal Conflicts 
 This code was inductive, and by virtue of the amendment and reservation proponent to 
treaty ratification, it came up as more of an excuse than justification for non-ratification. Since 
nations are able to make reservations to treaties, and thereby exempt themselves from 
committing to certain provisions, the argument that the treaty legally conflicted with the 
domestic legal structure was moot, as if there were provisions the government disagreed with 
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they could make a reservation addressing that problematic component to the treaty. Therefore, 
discussions of legal conflicts shed light on what the nation states found problematic about the 
treaty. In some cases the nation states’ determination to address the legal conflict, even though it 
could be circumvented by a reservation, indicated that it was problematic to the nation states’ 
sense of identity and nationalism. As might be expected, the United States claimed that there 
were more legal conflicts in comparison with the United Kingdom.  
 
Analysis 
 I performed a content analysis on the government documents previously discussed to 
understand what arguments and reasoning were affecting the nation states’ decision-making 
processes regarding ratification of the ICESCR. I also looked at national statistics from public 
opinion polls within the United States to understand how favorably civil society felt toward the 
manner in which human rights was being handled by their government leaders, to give an 
indication of their attitudes toward the ICESCR. This helps to understand the norm convergence 
as discussed with ideational-constructivist theory and to understand the relationship between 
government actors and the manner in which they are constrained by the wishes of their populace, 
by virtue of their democratic government. I focused on public opinion within the United States 
because the constraint of government actors that may have been felt within the United Kingdom 
with regard to human rights was not sufficient to prevent ratification.  
 
Researcher Standpoint 
 It is important to note how I may have influenced this study or its findings. As an 
undergraduate student interested in pursuing human rights law post-graduation, my personal 
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interest in this research topic is biased in favor of ratifying international human rights treaties. 
While taking a sociology course in which we were able to videoconference with the former 
Pakistani Ambassador to the United Nations about a wide range of human rights issues, the 
United States’ refusal to ratify the ICESCR surfaced multiple times as a significant obstacle to 
the worldwide implementation of human rights standards. As the United States is an extremely 
powerful country in the international community, a significant benefit that would accrue from 
human rights treaty ratification by the US is the increased legitimacy that ratification would 
provide for human rights standards throughout the world. I became frustrated with the United 
States’ refusal to ratify the Covenant and felt compelled to understand what sociological factors 
were impacting the nation’s decision, and nations’ decision-making processes more broadly with 
human rights doctrines.  
 
RESULTS 
 My analysis of these data revealed that the code for international pressures appeared most 
frequently, thereby deeming it the most important factor affecting the behavior of the United 
States and the United Kingdom These findings support the ideational-constructivist model, as 
international pressures resulted in credibility concerns that begin to explain behavioral changes 
by the nation states (albeit only rhetorical in the former case). Realist theory complements this 
explanation in its consideration of the nation states’ relative power as affecting its behavior, as 
relative power alters the weight that international pressures hold in nation states’ calculations of 
self-interest. While international pressures affecting the United Kingdom were not as apparent in 
the data due to its early ratification, the United Kingdom’s response to ratifying the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) sheds light 
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on how international pressures affected its decisions and further establishes that international 
pressures hold the power to modify nation state behavior.   
 
International Pressures 
 International pressures were found to be most clearly associated with behavioral change 
regarding treaty ratification, although the cases of the United States and United Kingdom were 
different in terms of their relative power internationally. As the United States was a superpower 
it was less vulnerable to international pressures but still sought to appease the international 
community, albeit on a mostly rhetorical level. International pressures on the United Kingdom 
did not appear to be as prevalent, due to its early ratification relative to other nation states. 
However, this does not mean that international pressures were not affecting the United Kingdom 
and its decision to move beyond a rhetorical commitment in support of the ICESCR.  
 International pressures influenced the United Kingdom to ratify the ECHR, as they felt 
that upholding a rhetorical commitment to human rights without ratifying a treaty protecting 
those rights rendered their claims indefensible (Moravcsik 2000: 242). The ECHR, which 
originally came into force in 1953, is designed to keep governments accountable with regard to 
human rights policy, by allowing individual citizens to challenge the domestic activities within 
their own country (Moravcsik 2000: 217). Moravcsik notes that in discussing the practicalities 
surrounding supporting the ECHR, the United Kingdom stressed “the compatibility of the ECHR 
with existing domestic legal practices dominated discussion-a fact suggesting also that decision-
makers took the commitment seriously” (2000: 238). The extensive discussion of 
implementation concerns surrounding the ICESCR also can be interpreted as indicating that both 
governments meant to take these commitments seriously. 
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 The United Kingdom was originally hesitant to support the ECHR, as their common 
complaint was the fear that it would undermine parliamentary sovereignty (Moravcsik 2000: 
240). Human rights treaties’ infringement upon nation state sovereignty is a frequently cited 
tension within human rights disputes, and can be understood as a calculation of self-interest. 
Moravcsik notes “For British decision-makers, the decisive point was not the nature of these 
concrete objections but the utter absence in the British domestic context of any countervailing 
self-interested argument in favor of membership.” (2000: 241). This illustrates that the realist 
component cannot be excluded from studying human rights decisions, as calculations about self-
interest can reduce a state’s support for a cause if overwhelming benefits are not perceived to be 
likely.  
 As nation states act to promote their self-interest, in weighing the different factors that 
influence their final decision, international pressures were influential throughout this process. In 
deciding to ratify the ECHR, an internal Foreign Office paper within the United Kingdom stated: 
 The alternative, namely refusal to become a party to a Convention acceptable to 
 nearly all the remaining States of the Council of Europe, would appear to be 
 almost  indefensible…Political considerations, both domestic and foreign, compel 
 us now to bring ourselves to accept. (Moravcsik 2000: 242) 
The United Kingdom’s perception of themselves as being left “indefensible” to explanations of 
why they refused to ratify the ECHR in light of international pressures exemplifies how 
influential these pressures are in affecting nation state behavior. International pressures have the 
potential to override the self-interest equation in favor of committing to an international human 
rights treaty that was previously considered not beneficial enough to the country to warrant 
ratification.  
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 In promoting his human rights rhetoric, Carter accentuated the United States’ role in the 
international community as the “champion of human rights.” In an attempt to motivate Senators 
to ratify the treaty, Carter wrote a letter to the U.S. Senate that argued if the United States didn’t 
ratify the treaty, then human rights standards would be implemented without United States 
oversight (International Human Rights Treaties, 1979). Carter directly suggests that the 
credibility of the United States has been questioned by stating “Regimes with which we raise 
human rights concerns will no longer be able to blunt the force of our approaches or question the 
seriousness of our commitment by pointing to our failure to ratify” (International Human Rights 
Treaties, 1979). In his appeal to the Senate to ratify the bill, Carter chose to emphasize the role of 
power and credibility as the most likely factors to compel the government to support the 
ICESCR.  
 Other nations expressed frustration with the United States’ rhetorical commitment to 
human rights and expressed how they would like to see action taken to back up these statements. 
In the General Assembly session that took place on October 26, 1977, which was 21 days after 
the United States signed the ICESCR, Ms. Mair, the Jamaican Ambassador to the United Nations 
eloquently stated that she was:   
 …surprised that those countries which spoke so zealously of freedom and peace, 
 which claimed to be the sole defenders of human rights in their own countries and 
 elsewhere and which waged noisy and hypocritical campaigns allegedly for 
 the promotion of human rights, had let more than 10 years go by before signing 
 them. (A/C.3/32/SR.32) 
Although Ms. Mair’s comment was indirect, it was certainly aimed at the United States. 
President Carter spoke zealously about his commitment to human rights, and his rhetoric 
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describing the United States as the “champion of human rights” fits her description. Also, 
President Carter was vocal about other nation states that were committing human rights 
violations, and it took the United States ten years exactly to sign the treaty once it became open 
for signature in 1966.  
 The Bulgarian Ambassador to the United Nations shared a similar sentiment to Ms. Mair 
in stating that there were “conspicuous absences from the list of States which had ratified or 
acceded to the Covenants, particularly among certain Western States which were in the habit of 
making frequent declarations about human rights” (A/C.3/32/SR.32). These critical statements 
indicated that the United States’ fear that it might lose credibility within the international 
community was well founded.  To defend this behavior, the United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Mrs. King responded that the United States was now committed to the 
promotion of economic, social and cultural rights, but did not express an intention to readily 
ratify the covenant. Rather she expressed that while Carter said he was sending the ICESCR to 
the Senate, “that might actually take a few years,” for ratification to take place (A/C.3/32/SR.33).  
 Lady Gaitskell, the United Kingdom’s delegate to the United Nations did not voice 
concerns about the United States’ lack of ratification, but instead stressed the importance of 
allocating resources to the Human Rights Committee so that it could function most effectively. 
She discussed how the United Kingdom supported the Human Rights Committees’ request for 
additional funding assistance from the Division of Human Rights branch (A/C.3/32/SR.32). 
President Carter, prior to signing the ICESCR, in addressing the United Nations also stressed the 
importance of financial support toward the Human Rights Committee (Walsh, 1977, p. A12).  
 In comparing the international pressures felt by the United Kingdom with the ECHR and 
the United States within the General Assembly, their differences in handling of the pressures is 
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worth noting. While rhetorical commitments to human rights were evoked by both nations, the 
United Kingdom’s understanding of its sentiments as “indefensible” without ratification of the 
ECHR suggested that it acknowledged a rhetorical commitment alone would not appease the 
international community. When statements from nations during the General Assembly meeting 
indirectly questioned the credibility of the United States’ commitment to human rights, Mrs. 
King’s statement that the Covenant had been signed but would take a few years to ratify 
attempted to stall criticism. While both were subject to international criticism, the United 
Kingdom acceded to the pressures and ratified the ECHR, while the United States carried out an 
additional non-binding commitment to economic, social and cultural rights through its signing of 
the Covenant. This suggests that the United States government, while concerned about 
international criticism, does not feel as compelled to comply with international demands as the 
United Kingdom. These results indicate that international pressures affect nation states’ 
behavior, as both cases warranted a change in their approach to human rights policy. 
International Factor: The Cold War 
 The United Kingdom did not have as direct a role in the Cold War as the United States, 
so while its government might have been affected by the Soviet tension, it was affected to a 
considerably lesser degree than the United States. In the documents I studied, the United 
Kingdom was not vocal about how the Cold War related to its ratification decision. References to 
the Cold War were represented within the United States as credibility concerns, providing 
evidence for the importance of international pressures in affecting nation state behaviors.    
 While not directly acknowledging the alignment of the USSR with economic, social and 
cultural rights as a factor influencing ratification, the United States still felt international 
pressures resonating from the Cold War. References to the Cold War were instead presented as 
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concerns that the Soviets would have more relative control than the United States in 
implementation if the United States did not ratify the covenant, and that other nations perceived 
their human rights policy to be “merely a cold war exercise” (International Human Rights 
Treaties, 1979). The United States acknowledged that their rhetorical commitments without 
ratification would call their credibility into question. Within the U.S. Senate hearing, Senator 
Yost expressed concern that if the United States didn’t ratify the ICESCR then when the second 
Helinski Accord Conference would be held, the United States would not have the authority to 
require that the Soviet Union fully comply with its provisions (International Human Rights 
Treaties, 1979). This sentiment expressed Yost’s concern that the United States’ credibility 
within the realm of international relations would be not only questioned but also weakened 
within the international community if it failed to ratify the ICESCR (International Human Rights 
Treaties, 1979).  
 This counters the hypothesis that the United States refused to ratify the ICESCR because 
of the USSR’s bias toward economic, social and cultural rights. The evidence indicates that 
advocates for the ICESCR within the United States used the Cold War rather to make an appeal 
to power dynamics to encourage ratification. This illuminates the role that relative power holds 
in the decision-making process of the United States, reaffirming realist theory. The United 
Kingdom’s lack of focus on the Cold War indicates that it also does not appear to be a 
motivating factor for ratification.  As the references to the Cold War were used to encourage 
ratification rather that express fears about aligning with the same rights that the USSR promoted, 
Cold War ideology does not present a sufficient explanation for why the United States refused to 
ratify the Covenant.  
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Legal Conflicts 
 Legal conflicts that occurred within the data were identified by the United States rather 
than the United Kingdom, which could be due again to its early ratification, although the legal 
conflicts the United States cited turned out to be more of an excuse than actual obstacle to 
ratification. Although the legal conflicts within the United States were discussed at length, the 
very nature of treaty ratification allows for reservations to be made from specific excerpts that do 
not comply with domestic law. These legal conflicts therefore were able to be overcome, but 
examining what conflicts existed sheds light on the aspects of the Covenant that the United 
States felt the most uncomfortable with.  
 The United States discussed how ratifying the ICESCR was problematic due to its 
exclusion of a provision regarding property. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that “Everyone has the right to own property as well as in association with others. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” (International Human Rights Treaties, 
1979). Senator Jesse Helms discussed that when the Universal Declaration was being drafted the 
Soviet Union objected to this provision being included, but that President Truman demanded that 
the Declaration contain the 17
th
 article (International Human Rights Treaties, 1979). This set an 
unofficial precedent among United States Presidents that indicated that the United States would 
not ratify any treaties which didn’t acknowledge individuals’ right to property as a basic human 
right (International Human Rights Treaties, 1979). Senator Helms expressed his frustration with 
Carter for signing the ICESCR without this article, in stating that if the Senate were to ratify the 
covenant, it would “legitimize the unlawful expropriation without compensation or arbitrary 
seizure of Americans’ property overseas…Furthermore…would have for the first time have the 
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United States formally acquiesce to Socialist and Marxist governments’ denial of basic 
individual economic rights” (International Human Rights Treaties, 1979).  
 Harry Inman, a member on the advisory board for the International Human Rights Law 
Group, submitted a statement for the record to clarify that the ICESCR’s lack of a provision 
regarding property was not legally problematic. Inman stated that the ICESCR “could not be 
used to justify expropriation without fair compensation” (International Human Rights Treaties, 
1979). Inman recognized that Helms’ concern was of a symbolic nature, since one of the rights 
the U.S. government was founded upon included the right to property, and he suggested that 
ratification of the ICESCR with a declaration that restated Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration could “underscore the United States’ understanding of this commitment,” although it 
was “not necessary to preserving the right” (International Human Rights Treaties, 1979). 
Additionally, Law Professor Louis Henkin of Columbia University who was asked to submit a 
statement regarding the legal “conflicts” associated with the ICESCR stated that “the 
constitutional issues can be disposed of clearly and quickly” through reservations (International 
Human Rights Treaties, 1979).  
 The discussion of legal conflicts between the ICESCR’s provisions and the domestic 
government was a focus of the United States rather than the United Kingdom. However, since 
these legal conflicts could be fixed through a reservation or declaration that accompanies the 
ratification, it appears that the legal conflicts themselves did not impede ratification, but rather 
actors within the United States found underlying problems with the ICESCR beyond its legal 
demands. The failure to address the right to property, which the United States views as a 
fundamental right, suggests that the United States’ sense of identity was challenged by the 
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ICESCR, which emphasizes the importance of ideational-constructivist theory and nation state 
identity in explaining the United States’ refusal to ratify the Covenant.    
 
Implementation Concerns 
 Both the United Kingdom and the United States stressed implementation concerns 
especially with regard to the non-self executing nature of the treaty. The United Kingdom’s 
government structure made legal implementation of the Covenant more difficult, especially due 
to its non-self executing nature. The United States has a binding constitution whereas the United 
Kingdom operates under a common law system, which during the era under study did not have a 
constitutional court. Moravcsik discusses how international covenants impose “…inconvenient 
constraints on individual national governments. Particularly for nations without a constitutional 
court – again, Britain is a striking example” (2000: 227). This would suggest that the actual 
implementation due to the legal structure would be more difficult for the United Kingdom than 
the United States. However, the United Kingdom’s decision to ratify despite incurred difficulties 
with its government structure indicates that other factors must have been influential in 
encouraging its ratification.  
 However, while the United States stressed that the rights embodied within the ICESCR 
were unable to be implemented, the United Kingdom sought ways to measure their success on 
their own terms. In the United Nations General Assembly discussion Lady Gaitskell, 
representing the United Kingdom stated that “economic and social right are for the most part 
widely attainable in the long term as economic and social progress is made,” and though she 
  42  
   
acknowledged that these rights would take more time to come into effect as opposed to civil and 
political rights, she did not see this as a deterrent to their actualization.
9
 
 Within the United States, controversy arose surrounding the appropriateness of human 
rights treaties as a measure for the increased protection of human rights domestically. Advocates 
of treaty ratification expressed that “adherence [to the Covenant] would neither detract from nor 
enhance the human rights already enjoyed by American citizens, while United States adherence 
would lend weight to efforts for the achievement of human rights throughout the world” (Library 
of Congress 1968). This illustrates that the United States, in weighing its potential benefit from 
ratifying the Covenant, didn’t believe its domestic protection of human rights would be 
extensively improved through ratification, but acknowledged that it would help the world 
community. Those opposed to the Covenant argued that treaties weren’t the proper measure with 
which to improve human rights conditions, as human rights was “a matter of domestic concern,” 
and they were concerned that the “broad terminology with which many provision of the 
conventions are written” would lead to an encroachment upon national sovereignty and states 
and individual rights (Library of Congress, 1968).  
 Vita Bite, an Analyst in International Relations, Foreign Affairs and National Defense 
Division, prepared a Primer of U.N. Human Rights treaties in June of 1977 in which she 
discussed the different treaties and conventions at hand and what government action had been 
taking regarding these documents. U. S. Representative Harris claimed that the rights embodied 
in the ICESCR were really just “objectives,” and therefore unable to be implemented by the 
government (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1977). Within this report, U.S. 
                                                 
9
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Report on the proceedings of the twenty-first session of 
 the General Assembly of the United Nations held at New York’ (Cmnd 3369, 1967) 
 [157] 
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Representative Patricia Harris cited article 2 paragraph 1 of the ICESCR as problematic because 
it states that each nation state party to the Covenant will take steps: 
 individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially  
 economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view  
 to achieving progressively the full realization of rights recognized in the present 
 Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of  
 legislative measures. (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1977)  
This original claim that the rights embodied within the ICESCR were merely “objectives” was 
no longer the official stance of the United States once its credibility was called into question 
during a General Assembly meeting. This illustrates a discrepancy in rhetorical commitment to 
economic, social and cultural rights between the domestic and international levels of the United 
States government. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. King, defended 
the nations’ delayed action in signing the ICESCR as being due to its focus on overcoming and 
combating racism and segregation on the domestic front, elaborating that through this experience 
the United States learned that: 
 In the modern world, with all its injustices, it had come to recognize the absolute 
 necessity of working for economic, social and cultural rights for all peoples and 
 nations…[and that it was] impossible to separate civil and political rights from 
 economic, social and cultural rights. (A/C.3/32/SR.33) 
This transition from describing economic, social and cultural rights as “merely objectives” to 
inseparable from civil and political rights represented a rhetorical change influenced by 
international pressures. International pressures continued to emerge as the most important factor 
in affecting behavioral change of the United States. 
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 In contrast with the United States, the United Kingdom acknowledged that economic, 
social and cultural rights were of a different nature than civil and political rights but encouraged 
development of effective standards of measurement to ensure that these rights are being 
protected. In the Report from the Select Committee on Overseas Development, the United 
Kingdom stressed that the: 
 debate now taking place as to the adequacy of gross product as a measure of 
 economic and social progress relates to the realisation that development planning 
 should be planning for…the enhancement of the quality of life of the whole 
 community and the welfare of individuals."
10
  
While the proper measurement for gauging progress with economic, social and cultural rights 
was still undecided, the United Kingdom repeatedly stressed that they were confident that these 
rights were attainable. Lady Gaitskell’s statement to the third committee of the United Nations 
during November of 1966, when the Covenant was still being drafted, read that “economic and 
social rights are for the most part widely attainable in the long term as economic and social 
progress is made.”
11
 The United Kingdom saw economic and social progress as becoming 
attainable once: 
 …governments of all countries, already requested to ratify and implement the 
 International Covenants on Human Rights, be invited to place in the forefront of 
 their aid, trade and development policies and projects, as the explicit objective of 
                                                 
10
 United Kingdom, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1973, Paper no. 294-II, pp. 216 
 
11
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Report on the proceedings of the twenty-first session of  the General 
 Assembly of the United Nations held at New York’ (Cmnd 3369, 1967) [158] 
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 their bilateral negotiations, the furtherance of the economic, social and cultural 
 rights of all the people.”
12
  
In discussing implementation concerns, the United States’ transition in rhetoric from the 
domestic to international level when discussing economic, social and cultural rights suggests that 
international pressures compelled the United States to change its rhetoric. The framing of the 
United States’ implementation concerns in terms of how the provisions conflicted with its 
national identity suggests that the difficulties associated with implementation itself was not the 
cause for its refusal to ratify the ICESCR. The United Kingdom’s rhetorical commitment to the 
progress of economic, social and cultural rights even before its signing of the Covenant, followed 
by its ratification of the ICESCR despite implementation challenges that existed due to the nature 




 Expressions of exceptionalism from either country were difficult to find within the data, 
which could be due to the nature of the government documents under examination. The United 
States’ history of unwillingness to be held to international standards and its insistence that it had 
been taking care of economic, social and cultural rights on its own accord without ratifying the 
treaty could indicate exceptionalistic behavior, although no record of exceptionalistic statements 
were found in the documents I analyzed.  
 The United Kingdom was not seen as exceptionalistic, and on the contrary, the 
government proposed enforcement mechanisms that inherently promoted anti-exceptionalistic 
                                                 
12
 United Kingdom, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1973, Paper no. 294-II, pp. 216 
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behavior. In Lady Gaitskell’s statement to the third committee of the United Nations during 
November of 1966, she stressed her belief that a complaint mechanism
13
 that allows one nation 
state to complain about the human rights practice of another nation state would be an effective 
enforcement measure in implementing these rights.
14
 Supporting the proposal of such a measure 
that would hold all nation states accountable to one another was not received well by the Soviet 
Union, who believed that this would create heightened tension among the international 
community.
15
 However, Lady Gaitskell maintained that “Covenants without the sword are but 
empty words,” which not only emphasizes the need of enforcement mechanisms to support the 
ICESCR but also the need of governments to commit to the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights beyond the mere use of rhetoric.
16
 The lack of evidence for exceptionalism within 
this study suggests that it was not a particularly influential factor affecting behavior of the nation 
states in their decisions regarding ratification of the ICESCR.  
 
DISCUSSION 
  The combination of realist and constructivist approaches, as complemented by republican 
liberalism and the world society approach sheds light on what influenced the United States and 
the United Kingdom to make their decisions about ratifying the ICESCR. Each government 
sought to act in their own self-interest, which due to international pressures existed on both 
domestic and international levels. Nation states are often left in a bind, as their governments are 
forced to act in a certain way that will meet the expectations of their populace, while 
                                                 
13
 This “mechanism” took the form of the Human Rights Committee 
14
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Report on the proceedings of the twenty-first session of  the General 
 Assembly of the United Nations held at New York’ (Cmnd 3369, 1967) [158] 
15
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Report on the proceedings of the twenty-first session of  the General 
 Assembly of the United Nations held at New York’ (Cmnd 3369, 1967) [159] 
16
 Ibid, 159. 
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simultaneously feeling compelled to act in a manner that benefits the international community. In 
the case of the United States however, tensions existing in this two-level game are not a 
sufficient explanation for its inaction, as public opinion was not opposed to ICESCR ratification. 
Ideational-constructivist theory and world society approach explain how international pressures 
and identity influence nation states’ decisions, while an incorporation of realist theory and 
republican liberalism provides insight into how these factors affect how nations take into account 
their relative power within the international community in determining what action is in their 
self-interest. Within the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom, international 
pressures have caused credibility concerns regarding the nations’ commitment to human rights 
by appealing to their conceptions of identity, which resulted in rhetorical and behavioral changes 
in both nations. The type of change evoked depends on the nations’ calculation of self-interest 
which analyzes all these factors, while taking the relative power of the nation into consideration.    
 While I originally hypothesized that Cold War ideology and attitudes of exceptionalism 
would be the factors that most influenced the nation states’ decision to ratify the ICESCR, the 
evidence did not fulfill these expectations. My findings showed that discussions on behalf of the 
United States regarding the Cold War or the Soviets were framed in terms of credibility and 
power concerns. The United States’ concern that it would not be able to oversee human rights 
implementation if it didn’t ratify the ICESCR, in addition to its concern that non-ratification 
would exempt the Soviets from having to follow the United States’ orders at the second Helinski 
Accord Conference, demonstrates the salience of the relationship between international pressures 
and a nation state’s relative power within the international community.  
 Within the examples studied, compliance with international pressures to support human 
rights treaties protecting economic, social and cultural rights has been seen to increase the 
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relative power of the nation state. This is evident through the United States’ fear that non-
compliance with international pressures to ratify the ICESCR would decrease its ability to 
oversee implementation of human rights provisions. Contrastingly, the United Kingdom’s 
relative power within the international community was enhanced through its ratification of the 
ECHR. Once having ratified the ECHR and the ICESCR, the United Kingdom was able to 
harness its influential power to pressure governments to support human rights initiatives, through 
promoting increased funding of the Human Rights Committee and by encouraging nations to 
continue economic progress through treaty ratification. While the United States expressed similar 
sentiments of support for economic, social and cultural rights, the nation’s lack of binding 
support left it open to criticism from the international community, which challenged its relative 
power within the international community regarding human rights.  
 The United Kingdom’s disagreement with the Soviets in terms of human rights 
enforcement measures being implemented illustrated that its focus with regard to the Cold War 
was not framed in terms of power, but rather in international cooperation. International 
cooperation emerged as a broader theme for the United Kingdom, however this does not mean 
that self-interest and power were absent from the government’s decision-making processes. The 
United Kingdom rather determined that it would be in their self-interest to act favorably toward 
the international community by ratifying international human rights treaties. The United 
Kingdom’s emphasis on nation states holding one another accountable was viewed as anti-
exceptionalistic, as it committed itself to being held to the same standards as other nation states, 
thereby sacrificing some of its sovereignty for the empowerment human rights among the world 
community as a whole.  
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 Both nations felt that their credibility was being called into question by international 
pressures that encouraged their ratification of human rights treaties protecting economic, social 
and cultural rights through appealing to the government’s sense of identity. As both nations 
perceive themselves to be promoters of human rights, they determined that it was in their self-
interest to take action that would reaffirm their credibility and sense of identity. The United 
States’ solution to these credibility concerns took the form of a rhetorical change in attitude, 
rather than behavioral change of a binding commitment to the ICESCR. Republican liberalism 
sheds light on this decision, as the United States was a secure democracy and did not need to 
ratify the Covenant as rapidly as an unstable democracy would, because of the lesser likelihood 
that the United States government will be overrun. This sense of stability is also applicable 
within the international community, as the United States maintains a superpower status in 
relation to other nations. The belief that the United States only needed to create rhetorical 
changes (and the behavioral act of performing a nonbinding commitment through the act of 
signing the Covenant) to address these credibility issues illustrates that the nation felt secure 
enough about its relative power within the international community to determine that the 
questioning of its credibility was not deemed detrimental enough to its self-interest to compel it 
to ratify the ICESCR.  
 In contrast, when the United Kingdom felt international pressure to join the ECHR, 
credibility concerns affected the nation state to the point where government actors deemed their 
rhetorical commitments “indefensible” and decided to take action to support the Convention. The 
United Kingdom viewed itself as being able to gain more power within the international 
community by ratifying the ECHR than if it were to exempt itself from the international 
standards that it was encouraging other nations to comply with. The United Kingdom’s original 
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disagreement with the ECHR was framed in terms of its self-interest, as it didn’t believe that 
becoming a party to the Convention would be beneficial, and it chose to support the ECHR when 
international pressures became overwhelming. As the United Kingdom is by no means a 
vulnerable nation state, this gives additional support to the argument that international pressures 
are the most prevalent influence in predicting nation state behavior, as seen with their ability to 
pervade a nation’s conception of its identity, self-interest and power.  
 This study suggests that an important factor impacting the decision-making processes of 
nation states’ is the influence international pressures have over nations’ perceptions of identity 
and relative power within the international community in their calculation of self-interest. 
Ideational-constructivist theory discusses how as nations internalize norms they become part of 
their national identity. International pressures may challenge a nation’s sense of identity by 
calling into question the credibility of their rhetorical commitment to these norms without 
complementary binding agreements. As supported by world society approach, these pressures 
have the power to evoke a behavioral change to reaffirm the nation’s desired sense of identity 
because nations feel compelled to legitimate themselves according to the human rights norms 
within the international community.  
 
Research Limitations 
 The scope of this study was limited in its ability to explore the effects of social 
movements and other factors that influenced nation state behaviors. While the incorporation of 
public opinion polls begins to shed light on the popular attitudes toward the Covenant, a more 
comprehensive analysis of social movements specifically pertaining to the promotion of 
economic, social and cultural rights presents a potentially insightful avenue for further study. As 
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international pressures were the most salient factor with regard to influencing nation state 
decision-making, it would be worth investigating how social movements added to the 
international pressures, and if they were more or less influential toward policy change than other 
national governments. 
 The limited focus on publicly available government documents also narrowed the scope 
of the study. While a nation’s attitudes about its relative power within the international 
community and what it believes to be in its self-interest can be inferred through an analysis of 
government documents, more candid and perhaps telling statements are not generally found in 
these documents. The government actors composing the documents I analyzed knew that they 
would be made publicly available and therefore were more careful about the sentiments they 
expressed and their use of rhetoric. An exploration of confidential governments may have 
provided an opportunity for more explicit underlying causes to be investigated, including the 
notion of exceptionalism. Future research could more comprehensively explore the relationship 
between a nation’s level of exceptionalism and how it interacts with international pressures.  
 
Implications 
 This study’s unique comparison between the United States and the United Kingdom 
allows for an analysis of the inner-workings of government decision-making from two nations 
that publicly advocate for human rights. The discrepancy in their action is paralleled by their 
discrepancy in relative power, although both are acknowledged as powerful nations among the 
Security Council within the United Nations, putting them on equal footing with the international 
community, despite the United States’ superpower status. The comparison of these two cases is 
unique because both nations hold an equal responsibility to the international community, but this 
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responsibility is actualized in different ways, and the international pressures affecting the nations 
are likewise internalized differently.  This study’s blend of realist and constructivist theory sheds 
light on the manner in which different factors interact to shape nation states’ policy decisions. 
The most influential factor, which conveniently is the factor that is also most easily controlled, is 
the international pressures that a nation state faces. As nation states consider their relative power 
and self-interest in their evaluation of how international pressures will affect them, it becomes 
clear that if there is hope for progressive policy change, then added emphasis on international 
pressure is needed. This study suggests that international pressure holds the potential to skew the 
calculation of relative power and nations’ sense of identity toward viewing the ratification of 
human rights instruments to be in the nations’ self-interest.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 While ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
remains at a standstill in the United States Senate, thus hindering international progress, we can 
learn from this analysis of the United States and the United Kingdom that international pressures 
must be taken into serious consideration to evoke behavioral changes from nation states. The 
results suggest that international pressures target the nation states’ sense of identity and relative 
power within the international community, which affects its calculation of self-interest. As this 
study has shown the importance of international pressures in affecting nation states’ decisions to 
ratify human rights treaties, I suggest that these external international pressures continue to be 
complemented by a simultaneous internal pressure on nation state governments that stems from 
the domestic arena. This dual-layered approach holds the nation state more accountable to its 
rhetorical commitments, on both domestic and international levels. As pressures emanate 
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simultaneously from both international and domestic levels, over time governments will need to 
address challenges to the nation’s construction of identity and relative power that are a result of 
these pressures. Continued advocacy for ratification of human rights treaties working in 
complement with grassroots efforts holds the potential to move human rights commitments 
beyond the rhetorical arena. As we continue to enhance our understanding of how these 
pressures influence the actions of nation state governments, we will be better equipped to more 
effectively harness their power to create progress toward a worldwide attainment of  “a life of 
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Appendix A: Chart of Nation States having Signed and/or Ratified the 
ICESCR 
 




Afghanistan  January 24, 1983 a 
Albania  October 4, 1991 a 
Algeria December 10, 1968 September 12, 1989 
Angola  January 10, 1992 a 
Argentina February 19, 1968 August 8, 1986 
Armenia  September 13, 1993 a 
Australia December 18, 1972 December 10, 1975 
Austria December 10, 1973 September 10, 1978 
Azerbaijan  August 13, 1992 a 
Bahamas December 4, 2008 December 23, 2008 
Bahrain  September 27, 2007 a 
Bangladesh  October 5, 1998 a 
Barbados  January 5, 1973 a 
Belarus March 19, 1968 November 12, 1973 
Belgium December 10, 1968 April 21, 1983 
Belize September 6, 2000  
Benin  March 12, 1992 a  
Bolivia  August 12, 1982 a 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 September 1, 1993 d 
Brazil  January 24, 1992 a 
Bulgaria October 8, 1968 September 21, 1970 
                                                 
17
 Succession to the treaty refers to one nation state replacing another in its commitment to the 
treaty 
  55  
   
Burkina Faso  January 4, 1999 a 
Burundi  May 9, 1990 a 
Cambodia October 17, 1980 May 26, 1992 a 
Cameroon  June 27, 1984 a 
Canada  May 19, 1976 a 




 May 8, 1981 a 
Chad  June 9, 1995 a 
Chile September 16, 1969 February 10, 1972 
China October 27, 1997 March 27, 2001 
Colombia December 21, 1966 October 29, 1969 
Comoros September 25, 2008  
Congo  October 5, 1983 a 
Costa Rica December 19, 1966 November 29, 1968 
Côte d’Ivoire  March 26, 1992 a 
Croatia  October 12, 1992 d 
Cuba February 28, 2008  
Cyprus January 9, 1967 April 2, 1969 
Czech 
Republic 









 November 1, 1976 a 
Denmark March 20, 1968 January 6, 1972 
Djibouti  November 5, 2002 a 
Dominica  June 17, 1993 a 
Dominican 
Republic 
 January 4, 1978 a 
Ecuador September 29, 1967 March 6, 1969 
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Egypt August 4, 1967 January 14, 1982 
El Salvador September 21, 1967 November 30, 1979 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
 September 26, 1987 a 
Eritrea  April 17, 2001 a 
Estonia  October 21, 1991 a 
Ethiopia  June 11, 1993 a 
Finland October 11, 1967 August 19, 1975 
France  November 4, 1980 a 
Gabon  January 21, 1983 a 
Gambia  December 29, 1978 a 
Georgia  May 3, 1994 a 
Germany October 9, 1968 December 17, 1973 
Ghana September 7, 2000 September 7, 2000 
Greece  May 16, 1985 a 
Grenada  September 6, 1991 a 
Guatemala   May 19, 1988 a 
Guinea February 28, 1967 January 24, 1978 
Guinea-
Bissau 
 July 2, 1992 a 
Guyana August 22, 1968 February 15, 1977 
Honduras December 19, 1966 February 17, 1981 
Hungary March 25, 1969 January 17, 1974 
Iceland December 30, 1968 August 22, 1979 
India  April 10, 1979 a 
Indonesia  February 23, 2006 a 
Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) 
April 4, 1968 June 24, 1975 
Iraq February 18, 1969 January 25, 1971 
Iceland October 1, 1973 December 8, 1989 
Israel December 19, 1966 October 3, 1991 
Italy January 18, 1967 September 15, 1978 
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Jamaica December 19, 1966 October 3, 1975 
Japan May 30, 1978 June 21, 1979 
Jordan  June 30, 1972 May 28, 1975 
Kazakhstan December 2, 2003 January 24, 2006 
Kenya  May 1, 1972 a 
Kuwait  May 21, 1996 a 




December 7, 2000 February 13, 2007 
Latvia  April 14, 1992 a 
Lebanon  November 3, 1972 a 
Lesotho  September 9, 1992 a 
Liberia April 18, 1967 September 22, 2004 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
 May 15, 1970 a 
Liechtenstein  December 10, 1998 a 
Luxembourg November 26, 1974 August 18, 1983 
Madagascar April 14, 1970 September 22, 1971 
Malawi  December 22, 1993 a 
Maldives  September 19, 2006 a 
Mali  July 16, 1974 a 
Malta October 22, 1968 September 13, 1990 
Mauritania  November 17, 2004 a 
Mauritius  December 12, 1973 a 
Mexico  March 23, 1981 a 
Monaco June 26, 1997 August 28, 1997 
Mongolia June 5, 1968 November 18, 1974 
Montenegro  October 23, 2006 d 
Morocco January 19, 1977 May 3, 1979 
Namibia  November 28, 1994 a 
Nepal  May 14, 1991 a 
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Netherlands June 25, 1969 December 11, 1978 
New Zealand November 12, 1968 December 28, 1978 
Nicaragua  March 12, 1980 a 
Niger  March 7, 1986 a 
Nigeria  July 29, 1993 a 
Norway March 20, 1968 September 13, 1972 
Pakistan November 3, 2004 April 17, 2008 
Panama July 27, 1976 March 8, 1977 
Papua New 
Guinea 
 July 21, 2008 a 
Paraguay  June 10, 1992 a 
Peru August 11, 1977 April 28, 1978 
Philippines December 19, 1966 June 7, 1974 
Poland March 2, 1967 March 18, 1977 
Portugal October 7, 1976 July 31, 1978 
Republic of 
Korea 
 April 10, 1990 a 
Republic of 
Moldova 
 January 26, 1993 a 
Romania June 27, 1968 December 9, 1974 
Russian 
Federation 
March 18, 1968 October 16, 1973 
Rwanda  April 16, 1975 a 
San Marino  October 18, 1985 a 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 
October 31, 1995  
Senegal July 6, 1970 February 13, 1978 
Serbia  March 12, 2001 d 
Seychelles  May 5, 1992 a  
Sierra Leone  August 23, 1996 a 
Slovakia  May 28, 1993 d 
Slovenia  July 6, 1992 d 
Solomon 
Islands 
 March 17, 1982 d 
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Somalia  January 24, 1990 a 
South Africa October 3, 1994  
Spain September 28, 1976 April 27, 1977 




 November 9, 1981 a 
Sudan  March 18, 1986 a 
Suriname  December 28, 1976 a 
Swaziland  March 26, 2004 a 
Sweden September 29, 1967 December 6, 1971 
Switzerland  June 18, 1992 a 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
 April 21, 1969 a 
Tajikistan  January 4, 1999 a 





 January 18, 1994 d 
Timor-Leste  April 16, 2003 a 
Togo  May 24, 1984 a 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 December 8, 1978 a 
Tunisia April 30, 1968 March 18, 1969 
Turkey August 15, 2000 September 23, 2003 
Turkmenistan  May 1, 1997 a 
Uganda  January 21, 1987 a 







September 16, 1968 May 20, 1976 
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October 5, 1977  
Uruguay February 21, 1967 April 1, 1970 




June 24, 1969 May 10, 1978 
Viet Nam  September 24, 1982 a 
Yemen  February 8, 1987 a 
Zambia  April 10, 1984 a 
Zimbabwe  May 13, 1991 a 
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